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Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
—Robert Frost 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Not too long ago, I spoke at a two-day energy conference in
Houston. Most of the conference was devoted to energy
development all over the world, particularly oil and gas. At the
end of the conference, a well-respected professor summarized what
had been said and used existing activities to project what the
future holds. He spoke not a word about environment or climate
change, much less sustainable development. When question time
came, I asked him how climate change might affect his projections.
“I don’t know,” he replied. “What do you think?”
This article is an extended answer to his question. It argues
that the questions we have been asking about energy—the ones

* John C. Dernbach is Commonwealth Professor of Environmental Law
and Sustainability at Widener University Commonwealth Law School and
director of its Environmental Law and Sustainability Center. He can be
reached at jcdernbach@widener.edu. Thanks to Ed Sonnenberg for research
assistance and to Marc Prokopchak for editorial assistance. Thanks also to
Don Brown, Bernie Goldstein, and Jimmy May for comments on an earlier
draft.
1. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1916),
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hwxuek;view=1up;seq=2.
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that have framed national energy law and policy for decades—are
no longer the only relevant questions, and certainly not the best
questions. It is increasingly clear that the challenges of
sustainable development and climate change can no longer be
ignored. These challenges need to frame the way in which energy
law and policy decisions are made. Two roads are diverging. One is
most traveled. It is based on business-as-usual practices, which by
and large are unsustainable, and which lead to an unattractive
future. The other is “less traveled by,” often simply ignored, and
not even fully mapped, but it is based on sustainable practices and
offers our only hope of an attractive and sustainable future.
The questions that for decades have guided decision-making
on U.S. energy policy are about how to assure cheap, plentiful, and
secure energy. Another question is how to achieve basic
environmental and public health protection. 2 These questions tend
to frame our decisions about energy, and constitute the frame
within which the rapid development of shale gas has been placed.
These are necessary questions, but they are not sufficient to
address challenges that are becoming clearer every year. We thus
need to ask better questions. Better questions lead to more useful
answers, and thus more effective laws and policies. 3
Shale gas is a case in point. Beginning about a decade ago,
there has been tremendous growth in the extraction of gas from
shale through the use of horizontal drilling and hydrofracturing
with large volumes of high-pressure water.4 The effect is that
shale strata with little previous economic market value are now
the subject of substantial shale gas drilling and production. 5
Unconventional shale gas development, as it is called, has grown
rapidly, especially in North America. U.S. production has grown
“from 0.3 trillion cubic feet in 2000 to 9.6 trillion cubic feet in
2012.”6 In 2012, shale gas production was 39 percent of total U.S.
gas production and 15 percent of total Canadian gas production. 7
While less drilling from shale gas has occurred in other countries,
there is intense international interest where recoverable shale gas
reserves exist. 8 As this article is being written, gas prices are at a

2. John C. Dernbach, U.S. Policy, in G LOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S.
LAW 61, 66 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
3. MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS , THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG Q UESTIONS
(1990).
4. VIKRAM RAO, SHALE G AS: THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL 4–7 (2012).
5. Id.
6. U.S. Energy Information Administration, North America Leads the World
in Production of Shale Gas (Oct. 23, 2013), www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=13491 (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., SHALE G AS INTERNATIONAL, www.shalegas.international (last
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very low level, and relatively little new drilling is going on. 9 But
there is great interest in Pennsylvania and other states in the
planning and construction of pipelines to bring gas from existing
wells to market, including an international market. 10 An enormous
policy and popular literature exists concerning shale gas
development.11
At the same time, sustainable development has emerged as
an approach for reconciling conflicts between development and
environmental
protection.
Sustainable
development
is
a
framework for integrating environmental considerations and goals
into decisions concerning social and economic development, with
the ultimate objective of maintaining and improving human wellbeing. 12 There is a similarly large body of literature on sustainable
development. 13 The sustainable development literature describes,
in considerable detail, the ways in which sustainable development
has been applied to green building, 14 forestry, 15 agriculture, 16

visited Mar. 22, 2016) (international trade publication of shale gas industry).
9. Scott DiSavino, Big U.S. Shale Field Marcellus Faces Output Drop Due
to Low Gas Prices, REUTERS (May 28, 2015), www.reuters.com/article/natgasmarcellus-production-idUSL1N0YA2LJ20150528.
10. See, e.g., Stephanie Ritenbaugh, Marcellus Shale Region to See Wave of
Large Pipeline Projects, PITTSBURGH POST-G AZETTE (June 23, 2015),
http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/companies/2015/06/23/Marc
ellus-Shale-region-to-see-wave-of-large-pipeline-projects/stories/201506090010
(explaining that as many as 17 pipeline projects may be constructed in next
three years).
11. See, e.g., RUSSELL G OLD, THE BOOM : HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE
AMERICAN ENERGY REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD (2014); RAO,
supra note 4; SEAMUS MCG RAW, THE END OF COUNTRY: DISPATCHES FROM
THE FRACK Z ONE (2011).
12. John C. Dernbach & Federico Cheever, Sustainable Development and
its Discontents, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 247, 247 (2015).
13. The author has, for example, edited or coauthored three books
assessing sustainable development progress in the United States. JOHN C.
DERNBACH ET AL., ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS : ACCELERATING THE
TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY (2012); AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA
(John C. Dernbach ed., 2009); STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY (John C.
Dernbach ed., 2002). For a recent and helpful addition to the sustainable
development literature, see JEFFREY D. SACHS , THE AGE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (2015).
14. E.g., ABE K RUGER & CARL SEVILLE , G REEN BUILDING: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES IN RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION (2013); THE LAW OF G REEN
BUILDINGS : REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION,
O PERATIONS , AND FINANCING (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard eds.,
2010); Keith H. Hirokawa & Aurelia Marina Pohrib, The Role of Green
Building in Climate Change Adaptation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE ADAPTION LAW 355 (Jonathan Verschuuren ed., 2013).
15. E.g., K.M. REYNOLDS ET AL., SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY: FROM
MONITORING AND MODELING TO K NOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND POLICY
SCIENCE (2007); Federico Cheever & Ward J. Scott, Sustainable Forestry:
Moving from Concept to Consistent Practice, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE
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higher education, 17 and communities. 18 Oddly, however, there has
been very little discussion about the relationship between shale
gas, on one hand, and sustainable development, including climate
change, on the other. The most prominent exception may be found
in the work of the Center for Sustainable Shale Development, a
nongovernmental organization that has certified a small number
of companies for their adherence to certain sustainability practices
that the Center has developed. 19
This gap has considerable importance. It means that, except
for the little-used certification program run by the Center for
Sustainable Shale Development, there is nothing that translates
the broad principles of sustainable development into actual
practice concerning shale gas. Moreover, while that certification
program covers a wide range of practices related to environmental
impact, it has little to say about the wide range of social and land
use impacts caused by shale gas development. And while it
includes practices related to methane emissions from site
development and gas production, it does not address the overall
role of shale gas development in climate change. If shale gas
development is to be truly sustainable, it must fully address all
sustainable development issues. Moreover, the many claims made
about the positive economic, security, and job creation benefits of
shale gas20 cannot be fully evaluated unless other effects—
particularly social and environmental effects—are also evaluated.
Professor James May of Widener University Delaware Law School
and I have made an effort to fill that void with a recent book,
Shale Gas and the Future of Energy: Law and Policy for
Sustainability.21 The book includes twelve chapters by sixteen

AMERICA, supra note 13, at 285.
16. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL
SYSTEMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2010).
17. Wynn Calder & Julian Dautremont-Smith, Higher Education:
Emerging Laboratories for Inventing a Sustainable Future, in AGENDA FOR A
SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 13, at 93; John C. Dernbach, The Essential
and Growing Role of Legal Education in Achieving Sustainability , 60 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 489 (2011).
18. JEFF SPECK, WALKABLE CITY: HOW DOWNTOWN CAN SAVE AMERICA,
O NE STEP AT A TIME (2012); ROBERT H. FREILICH, ROBERT J. SITKOWSKI &
SETH D. MENNILLO, FROM SPRAWL TO SUSTAINABILITY: SMART G ROWTH, NEW
URBANISM , G REEN DEVELOPMENT, AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (2010).
19. Center for Sustainable Shale Development, www.sustainableshale.org/;
News, Center for Shale Gas Development, www.sustainableshale.org/news/
(showing companies that have received certification) (last visited Jan. 15,
2016).
20. See e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All of
Our Major Problems, 4 G EO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 22 (2013)
(summarizing benefits of unconventional gas development).
21. SHALE G AS AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY: LAW AND POLICY FOR
SUSTAINABILITY (John C. Dernbach & James R. May eds., 2016). This book
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contributing authors, including not only lawyers and current and
former policy makers, but also experts from public health, the
social sciences, economics, and other disciplines. As a starting
point, the book asks: Is shale gas development sustainable? If not,
can law and policy actually make shale gas development
sustainable, or are there inherent sustainability issues or
problems with shale gas development that cannot be solved by law
or policy? The book emphasizes that it is not enough to make some
effort or progress toward sustainability. The longer we stay
primarily committed to fossil fuel energy development, the more
expensive and less effective our response is likely to be. Thus, even
better questions are (1) can shale gas help accelerate the
transition to sustainability, and (2) if so, how? The book focuses on
five broad areas relevant to these questions: public health and the
environment; community; public participation, public information,
and access to justice; governance; and energy and climate change.
This article builds on, and draws from, the energy and climate
change aspects of the book; it does not contain a detailed
explanation of key findings or conclusions from the entire volume.
This article identifies three additional questions that sustainable
development would have us answer in making energy policy
decisions, using shale gas as a focal point. Sustainable
development, in other words, reframes the climate change and
energy policy debate in at least three mutually reinforcing ways.
Section II provides the normative lens through which these
three new questions emerge. It begins by describing sustainable
development, which would redirect the way in which development
occurs. Broadly understood, development is a way of improving
human wellbeing through economic growth and improved social
wellbeing as well as peace and security. As a conceptual model,
development is inherently flawed because, by not protecting the
environment and the people who depend on it, it tends to
adversely affect both. Sustainable development, by contrast, would
achieve the goals of development and protect the environment as
well as those who depend on it. Sustainable development
principles and concepts, in turn, are embedded in the United

grows out of the first national conference in the United States on the
confluence of shale gas development and sustainable development, “Marcellus
Shale Development and Pennsylvania: What Lessons for Sustainable
Energy?,” which was held on September 27, 2013, at Widener University
School of Law in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. For a recording of the conference,
as well as PowerPoint presentations from the various speakers, see WIDENER
UNIVERSITY COMMONWEALTH LAW SCHOOL, Marcellus Shale Development and
Pennsylvania: Symposium Takes Comprehensive Look at Marcellus Shale,
Sustainable Development and Fracking (Sept. 30, 2013), http://commonwealth
law.widener.edu/marcellusshale2013/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 22 The
Convention states, as a basic principle: “The Parties have a right
to, and should, promote sustainable development.” 23 It requires
countries to integrate climate change mitigation and adaptation
into their decision making. 24 Section II also describes the
landmark December 2015 Paris Agreement of the Conference of
the Parties to the Framework Convention, 25 in which parties
effectively agreed to a goal of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by
the second half of this century, based on sustainable
development. 26
Sections III, IV, and V then analyze three typical frames that
are used in developing and implementing shale gas laws and
policies in light of sustainable development and the Paris
Agreement. These sections explain the inadequacy of those frames,
and explain how those frames should be replaced by different
questions.
Section III explains that a typical frame for shale gas is based
on the ostensible greenhouse gas benefits of shale gas. Using gas
to produce electricity, the argument goes, produces fewer
greenhouse gas emissions than burning coal. But the question
should not be whether shale gas is contributing to some degree to
a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Rather, the question is
whether and to what extent the use of gas is consistent with the
scale and pace of required greenhouse gas emission reductions. As
Section III explains, greenhouse gas reductions to date from use of
gas do not begin to compare to the reductions required to avoid
catastrophic climate change. While new federal laws to address
emissions of greenhouse gas emissions put the United States on a
trajectory for achieving that goal over the next decade or so, they
do not get the U.S. to that objective.

22. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, https://unfccc.int
/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/
conveng.pdf [hereinafter Framework Convention].
23. Id., art. 3.4.
24. Id., art. 4.2(a).
25. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference
of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.21 (Adoption of the Paris Agreement) U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/l09r01.pdf. Decision 1/CP.21 has two parts, a preamble and an annex. The
annex contains the Paris Agreement itself. To avoid confusion with the Paris
Agreement, citations to the preamble will refer to Decision 1/CP.21, and
citations to the Paris Agreement itself will refer to the Paris Agreement.
26. “Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as
soon as possible . . . and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter . . . so as to
achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century . . . .” Id., art.
4.1. The “balance” of emissions and removals means net zero emissions.
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Section IV addresses a second typical question in energy and
climate change policy: how can we produce the energy we need? A
better question is: how much energy do we need? Sustainability, in
other words, focuses more on energy efficiency and conservation,
and would have us answer that question before plunging headlong
into shale gas development. The problem, as Section IV explains,
is that energy efficiency and conservation have not been deployed
to the full extent possible. In fact, the energy available by
extracting the remaining energy efficiency opportunities from the
economy is greater than the amount of energy available from shale
gas. A strengthened national effort to foster energy productivity—
which measures how much energy is needed to produce a dollar of
GDP—would almost certainly result in much less energy being
needed in the first place.
A third and final typical frame for shale gas policy is based on
the claim that shale gas produces economic benefits, including not
only economic development but also jobs and tax revenue. Here,
there is no doubt; economic benefits occur. 27 But as Section V
explains, a better question is not about the economic benefits of
shale gas standing alone, but also about costs of shale gas and the
benefits and costs of alternatives. Environmental regulation of
shale gas is intended to reduce or eliminate many of the
environmental and social costs of shale gas, but it varies
significantly from state to state, and certain legal tools that could
be of value have not been fully deployed. Moreover, some
impacts—including but not limited to land use and housing—are
not covered by environmental regulation. Other laws and policies
tend not to adequately address these other issues. Section V also
explains that energy efficiency and conservation produce more
benefits and have fewer costs than shale gas production. That
makes energy efficiency and conservation attractive approaches to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions—not only for their climate
change benefits, but for their other economic, social, and
environmental benefits. Energy efficiency and conservation also
impose fewer costs.
As already suggested, these three frames do not exhaust the
sustainability issues raised by unconventional shale gas
development. Shale gas also raises other sustainability issues,
including intergenerational issues such as “boom and bust” cycles
as communities experience drilling, production, depletion of the
gas resource, further drilling, further production, and ultimate
depletion. 28 Our book assesses the adequacy of existing regulatory

27. See Pierce, supra note 20.
28. Diana Stares, James McElfish & John Ubinger Jr., Sustainability and
Community Responses to Local Impacts, in SHALE G AS AND THE FUTURE OF
ENERGY, supra note 21, at 101.
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frameworks from a sustainability perspective and makes
recommendations for improving them. 29
These three frames, however, suggest directions that energy
and climate change law and policy need to move for shale gas as
well as other fossil fuels. They suggest that shale gas development
needs to be nested in a national and international legal and policy
framework that is moving rapidly toward net zero carbon
emissions. They also suggest the need for an intensified national
commitment to energy efficiency and conservation. Finally, they
suggest shale gas requires a sophisticated and comprehensive
regulatory system to protect the environment and public health as
well as a legal and policy framework capable of ensuring both
significant social and economic benefits and ensuring that no one
is made socially or economically worse off in absolute terms. If
shale gas is to be truly sustainable, or be part of a bridge to a
sustainable future, it must operate within these parameters.

II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE PARIS
AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Sustainable development—which may be one of the most
important ideas to emerge from the 20th century—would redirect
the manner in which development occurs. Instead of making
progress at the expense of the environment and the people who
depend on it, as development does, sustainable development would
protect and even restore the environment. The most urgent
manifestation of the need for sustainable development is climate
change. By providing a structure in which countries can
progressively reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, the Paris
Agreement also provides a pathway for making significant
progress toward sustainable development.

A. Sustainable Development
More than twenty years ago, the United States and the rest of
the world decided to change the way in which development occurs.
Development, as it has been carried out for decades, is about
increasing economic growth as well as social wellbeing.
Development also requires a foundation of peace and security. Its
ultimate objective is human well-being. 30 Development is no small
thing; it is and has been the framework in which progress is
measured. Improvements in economic growth, job creation, human

29. See infra notes 178–87 and accompanying text.
30. John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for
National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES . L. REV . 1, 9–14 (1998).
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health, and education are all evidence of progress. The status of
each country is defined in terms of whether it is developed (e.g.,
United States) or developing (e.g., Peru). What development
historically ignores or gives insufficient attention to, however, is
environmental protection. As a result, development tends to
produce economic and social benefits at the expense of the
environment and those who depend on the environment—persons
now living as well as future generations. 31
Across the globe, there is already considerable environmental
degradation, poverty, and inequality, as well as growing pressure
on the environment and natural resources. 32 By one estimate, the
world in 2050 is likely to have two billion more people than at
present (growing from 7 billion to 9 billion), global GDP that is
four times what we have now, energy consumption that is 80%
higher than that at present, and atmospheric concentration of
greenhouse gases as high as 685 parts per million 33 (compared to
449 parts per million in 2012). 34
The increasing costs of development led governments around
the world, in 1992, to endorse a modification of development. 35
This modification, called sustainable development, retains the
basic elements of development—economic growth and social
wellbeing based on peace and security—but adds environmental
protection. 36 The iconic definition of sustainable development is
“development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”37 The basic idea is that the environment and the people

31. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, O UR
COMMON FUTURE 28–37 (1987); John C. Dernbach et al., Sustainability as a
Means of Improving Environmental Justice, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L.
(2012).
32. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD
Environmental Outlook to 2050: The Consequences of Inaction —Highlights
(2012), www.oecd.org/env/indicators-modelling-outlooks/49846090.pdf.
33. Id. at 3 (greenhouse gas concentrations measured in terms of carbon
dioxide equivalent).
34. European Environment Agency, Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations,
www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/atmosphericgreenhouse-gas-concentrations-4/assessment (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
35. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (international strategy for sustainable
development); UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), www.unep.org/Docu
ments.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (principles for
sustainable development).
36. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National
Governance, supra note 30, at 21–29.
37. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
31, at 43. For an overview of what occurred at the 1992 U.N. Conference on
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who depend on the environment should no longer be the price of
progress. Instead, they should benefit from, or at the very least not
be harmed by, development. The basic action principle underlying
sustainable development is integrated decision-making, which
means that development and the environment need to be
considered and furthered together. 38 The effect of this approach is
not simply to reduce environmental impacts, but to redirect the
manner in which development occurs. Sustainable development is
now the officially endorsed international approach to maintaining
and improving the human condition. 39 This is especially true after
the U.N. General Assembly adopted Sustainable Development
Goals in 2015 that are intended to guide the manner in which
sustainable development occurs. 40
In principle, sustainable development is preferable to
conventional development for at least three reasons—all of which
follow from the preceding discussion. To begin with, it is more
equitable than conventional development because it does not
benefit some people by making other people worse off in absolute
terms than they were previously. In addition, it produces a wider
range of benefits than conventional development because it
includes not only economic and security benefits, but also social
and environmental benefits. Finally, sustainable development has
fewer costs than conventional development because it is not based
on acceptance of harm to people or the environment as part of the
price of progress. Because the costs of conventional development
blunt its benefits to some degree, and increasingly threaten to
outweigh its benefits entirely (e.g., climate change), the
conventional development model needs to be replaced. Still,
because sustainable development is a relatively new and
normative framework, and because it threatens many existing
ways of doing business, adoption and implementation have come

Environment and Development, in which nations first endorsed sustainable
development, see Dernbach, supra note 30, at 21–24.
38. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Ashfaq Khalfan, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES , PRACTICES , AND PROSPECTS 103 (2004); John
C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and Multiple
Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. G LOBAL LEGAL. STUD. 247
(2003).
39. G.A. Res. 70/1, pmbl. & ¶ 2 (Oct. 21, 2015) (“We are determined to
ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and
that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with
nature.”) “We are committed to achieving sustainable development in its three
dimensions – economic, social and environmental – in a balanced and
integrated manner.”; Dernbach & Cheever, Sustainable Development and its
Discontents, supra note 12, at 250 (explaining how sustainable development
has become internationally accepted framework for improving human
condition).
40. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 39.

2015]

Asking the Right Questions About the Future of Shale G as

387

more slowly than one would have hoped. 41 And in many cases,
sustainable development has been almost entirely ignored.
There is growing recognition that sustainable development
must occur much more quickly. Thus, it is not enough to make
some progress in improving environmental protection, economic
and social development, and peace and security. Extreme poverty
is still widespread and environmental conditions around the world
continue to deteriorate. 42 Concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere are rising, and are already at levels that have not
been seen for at least 800,000 years. 43 The 2012 United Nations
Conference on Sustainable Development thus emphasized the
need to “accelerate progress” toward sustainability. 44 Similarly,
the parties to the 2012 Conference of the Parties of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed on the
importance of “accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse
gases emissions.”45

B. The Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement is a landmark agreement in international
efforts to address climate change. It represents the first time since
the Framework Convention on Climate Change was opened for
signature in 1992 that all 196 parties have agreed to take actions
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 46 The only prior
agreement even remotely comparable to the Paris Agreement—the
Kyoto Protocol—limited only developed country’s emissions. 47

41. For assessments of mixed results in two countries, see DERNBACH ET
ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS , supra note 13 (assessing the United
States) and Andrea Ross, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE UK: FROM
RHETORIC TO REALITY? (2012) (assessing the United Kingdom).
42.
UNITED
NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME ,
G LOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL O UTLOOK 5: ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT
(2012), www.unep.org/geo/pdfs/geo5/GEO5_report_full_en.pdf.
43. WORKING G ROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 11 (2013),
www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf.
44. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future
We Want, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/16 (June 20–22, 2012), www.uncsd
2012.org/content/documents/814UNCSD%20REPORT%20f inal%20revs.pdf.
45. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Advancing the
Durban Platform, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (2012), https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/
election_and_membership/application/pdf/decision_2_cp18_adp_bureau.pdf.
46. Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic Climate
Agreement, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2015/12/12/proposed-historic-climate-pact-nears-finalvote/.
47. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 3.1 & Annex B, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
AL.,
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Framework Convention) entered into force in 1994, and
196 countries are now parties. 48 The objective of the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change is “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.”49 The Framework Convention does what its name
suggests; it creates an international framework to address climate
change based on mitigation, adaptation, reporting, scientific and
technological research, and annual meetings of the conference of
the parties. 50 It also requires all parties to establish, implement,
and periodically update national programs to mitigate climate
change. 51 The Framework Convention does not, however, contain
any legally binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
The Framework Convention treats developed and developing
countries differently. As its preamble states, developed countries
have contributed “the largest share of historical and current global
emissions of greenhouse gases.”52 They also, by definition, have
greater financial and technological resources. Thus, in ratifying
the Framework Convention, developed countries agreed to adopt
policies and measures that will demonstrate that they “are taking
the lead” in addressing climate change. 53 Still, developed countries
agreed only to the “aim" of reducing their greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. 54
In December 1997, at their annual meeting in Kyoto, Japan,
the parties agreed to a protocol containing binding greenhouse gas
emission limits for developed countries. 55 Under the Kyoto
Protocol, developed countries agreed to reduce their net
greenhouse gas emissions by at least five percent from 1990 levels
by 2008–2012. 56 No comparable commitment is included for
developing countries. The Protocol contains somewhat different
commitments for individual developed countries; the U.S.

48. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ,
Status of Ratification of the Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_
background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Jan.
16, 2015). There are actually 197 parties—196 countries and an economic
integration organization, the European Union. Id.
49. Framework Convention, supra note 22, art. 2.
50. Id., arts. 4–10.
51. Id., art. 4.1(b).
52. Id., at pmbl.
53. Id., art. 4.2(a).
54. Id., art. 4.2(a) & (b).
55. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 47.
56. Id., art. 3.1. The Annex I or developed countries also agreed to make
“demonstrable progress” by 2005 in meeting their commitments. Id., art. 3.2.
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commitment is seven percent below 1990 levels. 57 The U.S., under
the second President Bush, repudiated the Kyoto Protocol, citing
both economic reasons and the absence of commitments by
developing countries, particularly China and India.58 In contrast,
most other developed countries, including those in the European
Union, have been implementing the Kyoto Protocol and reducing
their greenhouse gas emissions. 59
A big question left open by the Kyoto Protocol is what to do
after 2012, the last year in the 2008–2012 commitment period. The
2012 conference of the parties in Doha, Qatar extended the Kyoto
Protocol date to 2020, 60 but that still left open the question of what
happens after then. Beginning in 2009, at the conference of the
parties in Copenhagen, Denmark, the process has shifted slowly
from “top down” commitments by developed countries to “bottom
up” commitments by all countries. 61 Under this new approach,
each country makes public pledges or commitments, called
intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) prior to the
Paris Agreement and nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
in the Agreement itself. 62 Just prior to the Paris conference, 178
out of Framework Convention’s 196 country parties had submitted

57. Id. at Annex B.
58. Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES . DOC. 444 (Mar. 13, 2001), www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-03-19/pdf/WCPD-2001-03-19-Pg444-2.pdf.
59. Emissions of the greenhouse gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol
declined by 19.8 percent between 1990 and 2013 in the 28 countries of the
European Union. EUROSTAT, Greenhouse Gas Emission Statistics,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emi
ssion_statistics (last updated Dec. 15, 2015). A key part of the European
approach has been the use of emissions trading, which is authorized by
articles 4, 6, and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 47. See generally,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Michael G. Faure & Marjan Peeters, eds., 2008) (describing
and analyzing European emissions trading system).
60. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol on its Eighth Session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8
December 2012, Decision 1/CP.8, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (Feb. 28,
2013), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/13a01.pdf. As of October
26, 2016, only 71 of the 144 required instruments of acceptance have been
received, and so the Doha Amendment has not yet taken effect. United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of the Doha
Amendment, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php
(last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
61. Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec.
2009), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
62. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_
portal/items/8766.php (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
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an INDC, representing 93 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas
emissions. 63
Also in the run-up to the Paris conference, the Conference of
the Parties translated the Framework Convention’s stabilization
objective into a maximum permissible surface temperature
increase. The most frequently stated goal was 2 °C (or 3.6 degrees
Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels. 64 Parties, it said in 2010,
“should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent
with science and on the basis of equity.” 65 In addition, the
conference stated the importance of “strengthening the long-term
global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge,
including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5
°C.”66 Closer to Paris, however, the parties had stated the goal in
terms of both temperatures. In 2014, for example, the Conference
of the Parties expressed the goal in terms of a “likely chance of
holding the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”67
The 2°C limit has been translated into a specific carbon
“budget”—a numerical limit on all additional emissions,
cumulatively, for the rest of the century. 68 The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change has concluded that this budget is
between 630 and 1,180 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent. 69
That range represents the cumulative total of all new emissions of
carbon dioxide equivalent between 2011 and 2100. 70 If cumulative
emissions do not exceed the figures in that range, the IPCC states,

63. Gregor Erbach, European Parliamentary Research Service, Negotiating
a New UN Climate Agreement: Challenges for the Paris Climate Change
Conference 16 (2015), www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/
572794/EPRS_IDA(2015)572794_EN.pdf.
64. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of
the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29
November to 10 December 2010, Decision 1/CP.16,¶ 4, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id. That translates to 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit.
67. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change , Report of
the Conference of the Parties on its Twentieth Session, Held in Lima from 1 to
14 December 2014, Decision 1/CP.20, FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2. The period of
1861 to 1880 provides a baseline for pre-industrial levels.
68. Fred Pearce, What Is the Carbon Limit? That Depends Who You Ask,
ENVIRONMENT360 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/what_is_the_
carbon_limit_that_depends_who_you_ask/2825/.
69. WORKING G ROUP III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE , CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 431
(2014), http://mitigation2014.org/report/publication/. A gigaton is one billion
tons. Carbon dioxide equivalent includes all greenhouses gases measured
according to the warming potential of carbon dioxide.
70. Id.
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it is “likely” that global average temperatures will stay below a
2°C increase. 71 To have a “likely” chance of staying within this
budget, IPCC says, global greenhouse gas emissions need to be 40
to 70 percent lower by 2050 and “near zero” gigatons of carbon
dioxide equivalent or “below” by 2100. 72 The term “likely”—as used
by both the Conference of the Parties and the IPCC—means that
the chance of a particular outcome is greater than 66 percent, 73 or
two out of three. Other calculations of a carbon budget provide less
time to reduce emissions that low. 74
The Paris Agreement is a framework for keeping global
greenhouse gas concentrations within that budget, and appears to
somewhat strengthen the level of ambition for doing so. It aims to
hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below
2°C above pre-industrial levels” and “to pursue efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change.”75 The 2014 goal of “holding the
increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels” suggests that satisfying either of these
temperature objectives would be sufficient. The Paris agreement
goal of keeping the average temperature “well below 2°C” indicates
that simply holding the increase to 2°C is not good enough. The
additional commitment to “pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C” does not constitute a commitment to achieving
that goal; it is only a commitment to try. But the Agreement’s
explicit recognition that achieving the 1.5°C goal “would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”
highlights a reality that was not expressly acknowledged one year
earlier: while the Framework Convention is intended to prevent
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,”76
there can be substantial adverse effects from climate change

71. Id. at 441. Working Group I reached a slightly different estimate about
the budget—1,010 additional gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent. IPCC
WORKING G ROUP I, supra note 43, at 27. Working Group I used a slightly
different methodology and did not use ranges. IPCC WORKING G ROUP III,
supra note 69, at 441.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 4 n.2.
74. For example, one paper focuses on the time period between 2000 and
2050, not 2000 and 2100, and calculates carbon budgets to avoid exceeding a
2°C increase based on cumulative emissions in the first half of this ce ntury.
Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets For Limiting
Global Warming To 2 °C, 458 NATURE 1158 (2009). Given past and projected
emissions, they conclude, “we would exhaust the CO 2 emission budget by 2024,
2027 or 2039, depending on the probability accepted for exceeding 2°C
(respectively 20%, 25%, or 50%).” Id. at 1159.
75. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.1(a).
76. Framework Convention, supra note 22, art. 2.
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before that occurs. That acknowledgement tilts the Paris
Agreement’s objective somewhat closer to 1.5°C. 77
As a first step toward reaching this objective, the parties also
agreed to “aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas
emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take
longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid
reductions thereafter.”78 Peaking refers to the fact that globally,
and in many countries, greenhouse gas emissions have been
increasing on an annual basis. Peaking occurs when the annual
increase stops, and every subsequent year brings lower emissions,
so that a curve of annual emissions over time shows an upward
slope, a peak, and then a downward slope. The rapid reduction is
to be accomplished “so as to achieve a balance between
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.” 79 In other
words, at some time between 2051 and 2100, total greenhouse gas
emissions are to be reduced to net zero.
The Paris Agreement puts primary responsibility for what
happens in particular countries where it has always been—with
the countries themselves. This is through the mechanism of
nationally determined contributions. The Paris agreement
affirmed those commitments and made them central to the global
climate change effort. 80
A key to effective action, a 2015 World Bank report on
achieving a zero-carbon future says, is “early action.” 81 Early
action is prudent, cost-effective, and cheaper, and avoids
technological lock-in (e.g., construction of fossil-fuel-based power
plants that will likely be in service for 40 or more years). 82
A major problem—known to the parties before Paris—is that
their INDCs, taken together, were not sufficient to put countries
on a trajectory toward keeping the average temperature increase
below 2°C. In 2015, prior to the conference, both the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International

77. Although not in the Paris Agreement, the Conference of the Parties
invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to provide, by 2018, a
special report “on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre -industrial
levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways.” Decision
1/CP.21, supra note 25, ¶ 21. That report is likely to affect the way in which a
1.5 °C objective is viewed.
78. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, art. 4.1.
79. Id.
80. Id. at arts. 3, 4.2, & 4.3.
81. MARIANNE FAY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT / THE WORLD BANK, DECARBONIZING DEVELOPMENT:
THREE
STEPS
TO
A
ZERO-CARBON
FUTURE
39
(2015),
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/
document/Climate/dd/decarbonizing-development-report.pdf.
82. Id.
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Energy Agency issued reports saying that the total emissions
reductions from all countries that had thus far submitted INDCs
would barely change the world’s greenhouse gas emissions
trajectory. 83 The Conference of the Parties in Paris noted this
emissions gap—between what is needed and what was promised—
“with concern.”84
As economist Nicholas Stern summarizes the available
scientific literature, the window for keeping temperatures under
2°C “is still open, but is closing rapidly.” 85 A variety of projections
based on business-as-usual emissions growth put the world on
track for a temperature increase of at least 3.7° to 4.8°C. 86 A 2012
report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research and Climate Analytics describes the impact of a
4°C temperature increase by 2100 as disastrous. 87 Such a world,
the report said, would be “one of unprecedented heat waves, severe
drought, and major floods in many regions, with serious impacts
on ecosystems and associated services,” and no certainty that
adaptation would even be possible. 88
Thus, what also sets the Paris Agreement apart—and will
ultimately determine whether humanity averts or limits the worst
effects of climate change—are processes that the agreement puts
in place to, among other things, periodically increase national

83. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Climate
Change Mitigation: Policies and Progress (summary) (2015), www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/9789264238787-sum-en/index.html?itemId=/content/summary
/d53d9178-en&mimeType=text/html (“Even if the INDCs and national targets
announced to date are fully achieved, the remaining global carbon budget
(consistent with a below 2 °C world) will be exhausted by around 2040 unless
stronger action is taken.”); International Energy Agency, Energy and Climate
Change: World Energy Outlook Special Report 12 (2015), www.iea.org/
publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2015SpecialReportonEnergyand
ClimateChange.pdf (“With INDCs submitted so far, and the planned energy
policies in countries that have yet to submit, the world’s estimated remaining
carbon budget consistent with a 50% chance of keeping the rise in temperature
below 2 °C is consumed by around 2040 – eight months later than is projected
in the absence of INDCs.”).
84. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, at ¶ 17.
85. NICHOLAS STERN, WHY ARE WE WAITING? THE LOGIC, URGENCY, AND
PROMISE OF TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE 32 (2015).
86. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK & INSTITUTE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , PATHWAYS TO
DEEP
DECARBONIZATION
4
(2014),
http://unsdsn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/DDPP_Digit_update d.pdf.
87.
INTERNATIONAL
BANK
FOR
RECONSTRUCTION
AND
DEVELOPMENT/WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMER
WORLD
MUST
BE
AVOIDED
(2012),
wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/
07/17/090224b0828c33e7/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Turn0down0the00orld0must0be0
avoided.pdf.
88. Id. at xiii–xiv, xviii.
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ambition. These processes should greatly enhance the likelihood
that the Paris Agreement will actually work. Beginning in 2020,
and every five years afterwards, each country is to “prepare,
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined
contributions that it intends to achieve.” 89 These, of course, are in
addition to those that countries already submitted. Each
“successive nationally determined contribution” is to “represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined
contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition.” 90 Beginning
in 2023, and every five years afterwards, the Conference of the
Parties is to “take stock of the implementation of this Agreement
to assess the collective progress towards achieving [its] purpose.”91
The outcome of this “global stocktake” is to “inform Parties in
updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their
actions,” including enhanced “international cooperation for climate
action.”92 Again, the overall objective is net zero greenhouse gas
emissions by the second half of the century. 93

89. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, at arts. 4.2, 4.9; see also Decision
1/CP.21, supra note 25, at ¶¶ 23, 24.
90. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, art. 4.3.
91. Id. at arts. 14.1, 14.2.
92. Id., art. 14.3. At least three other types of provisions are intended to
support this ratcheting effort toward greater ambition. First, while financial
assistance to developing countries has always been part of the international
framework to address climate change, developed countries agreed to increase
their level of financial support from previous levels by a nonspecific amount.
Id., art. 9.1. Developed countries also agreed to communicate “indicative
quantitative and qualitative information” about their financial support to
developing countries, including projected future levels of public finance. Id.,
art. 9.5. Second, the Paris Agreement creates “an enhanced transparency
framework for action and support.” Id., art. 13.1. This framework is partly to
understand what NDCs actually mean and achieve. NDCs from different
countries use different assumptions and baselines, and enhancing their
comparability is essential. This transparency framework is also needed to
better understand what financial contributions developed countries are
actually making to developing countries. Id., art. 13.5; Joseph E. Aldy,
Evaluating Mitigation Effort: Tools and Institutions for Assessing Nationally
Determined Contributions 3 (2015), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
evaluating-mitigation-effort-aldy_web.pdf (explaining differences in forms of
mitigation in 129 NDCs submitted through November 8, 2015). Third,
recognizing that “[a]ccelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is
critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and
promoting economic growth and sustainable development,” the agreement
creates a Technology Mechanism. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, at arts.
10.3, 10.5. The purpose of the mechanism is to strengthen existing efforts to
foster technology development and the transfer of technology to developing
countries. Id. at art 10.4. The “global stocktake” is to consider this and other
efforts to support “technology development and transfer for developing country
Parties.” Id. at arts. 10.2, 10.6.
93. Id., art. 4.1.

2015]

Asking the Right Questions About the Future of Shale G as

395

A significant challenge in implementing the Paris Agreement
will be the allocation of the emissions budget among many
countries. This allocation should be based on population, historical
contribution to global atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations,
development status (developed vs. developing), equity, and other
factors. The question of each nation’s “fair share” of the budget is
both essential and highly contested. 94 Moreover, instead of some
kind of ex ante allocation based on delineated principles to which
every country assents, it now appears that each country will
determine how it wants to proceed, and the de facto allocation will
be the sum total of their greenhouse gas emission reduction
commitments over time. That, of course, could create significant
problems in meeting the Paris Agreement’s carbon budget
objective. Whatever decisions individual countries make, it is
worth remembering that the Paris Agreement preserves to a
significant degree the Framework Convention’s orientation toward
developed country leadership. That means that the United States,
among other developed countries, should strive to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions as rapidly as possible. In other words,
the emissions reductions curves for developed countries should be
steeper than those for developing countries.

III. QUESTION 1: IS THE USE OF SHALE GAS
CONSISTENT WITH THE SCALE AND PACE OF
REQUIRED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION
REDUCTIONS?
As the Paris Agreement makes clear, the world as a whole
must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions as rapidly as possible,
beginning now. The Agreement provides good news and bad news
for shale gas. The good news is that it provides a way for shale gas
to be a bridge to a sustainable future. The bad news in the Paris
Agreement is that, unless some cost effective means of large scale
carbon storage is developed in the relatively near future, the
bridge needs to be relatively short. But to work in the United
States, the Paris Agreement must be translated into national law
and policy.
The argument for the greenhouse benefits of shale gas is
based on the claim that the burning of gas involves about half of

94. DONALD A. BROWN, CLIMATE CHANGE ETHICS : NAVIGATING THE
PERFECT MORAL STORM (2012); Fred Pearce, The Trillion-Ton Cap: Allocating
the World’s Carbon Emissions, ENVIRONMENT360 (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_trillionton_cap_allocating_the_worlds_carbon_emissions/2703/.
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the greenhouse gas emissions as the burning of coal. 95 There is
much evidence to support this claim. According to several life-cycle
analyses, unconventional shale gas has lower greenhouse gas
emissions than coal when used to produce electricity. 96 In fact, a
new combined-cycle natural gas plant that replaces a conventional
coal plant emits about one-third of the carbon dioxide that the coal
plant emits. 97 Because gas is now cheaper than coal, gas is
displacing coal, principally for electricity production; coal
production in the United States hit a 30-year low in 2015. 98 The
Energy Information Administration has projected that, in 2016,
natural gas will exceed coal for electricity generation for the first
time. 99 Indeed, while U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2013 were
5.9 percent higher than they were in 1990, they peaked in 2007
and have been slightly lower since that time. 100 Of course, the
economic recession that began in 2007-2008 played a role in
reducing emissions, but so has the replacement of coal by natural
gas to produce much electricity. 101 The displacement of coal by gas
has also had other benefits, including reduced emissions of
nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and particulates. 102
Still, according to Don Brown, there are two significant
problems. 103 First, methane leakage raises questions about the

95. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Leveraging Natural Gas to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2 (2013), www.c2es.org/docUploads/
leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-ghg-emissions.pdf.
96. E.g., Garvin Heath et al., Harmonization of Initial Estimates of Shale
Gas Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Electric Power Generation , 111
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI . E3167 (2014); Andrew Burnham et al., Life-Cycle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Shale Gas, Natural Gas, Coal, and Petroleum,
46 ENVTL. SCI . & TECH. 619 (2012).
97. Daniel P. Schrag, Is Shale Gas Good for Climate Change?, 141
DAEDALUS 72, 72 (2012).
98. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Production and Prices
Decline in 2015 (Jan. 8, 2016), www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=
24472 (showing that coal production in 2015 was lower than it had been since
1986, and attributing decline to rise in market share of natural gas and
renewable energy as well as decline in export market).
99. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Expected to
Surpass Coal in Mix of Fuel Used for U.S. Power Generation in 2016 (Mar. 16,
2016), www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25392.
100. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S.
G REENHOUSE G AS EMISSIONS AND SINKS : 1990–2013 at ES-4 (2015),
www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory2015-Main-Text.pdf.
101. Id. at ES-12.
102. Union of Concerned Scientists, Environmental Impacts of Natural
Gas,
www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-other-fossilfuels/environmental-impacts-of-natural-gas.html#.Vx5__U10yUk (last visited
Apr. 25, 2016).
103. The structure of the argument in this section is based on Donald A.
Brown, Is Shale Gas Part of a Sustainable Solution to Climate Change? A
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extent of the greenhouse gas emissions reduction that is being
claimed. Natural gas is made up mostly of methane, which is more
than 20 times as potent a greenhouse gas as carbon dioxide over a
100-year period. 104 Methane leaks can occur in a variety of ways
during gas production, transportation, and use. Understanding the
effect of methane leakage involves a difficult methodological
question. Recent studies employing varying methodologies have
found varying rates of methane leakage from the production and
distribution of shale gas. 105 Because of the potency of methane as a
greenhouse gas, a relatively small leakage rate would significantly
offset the entire apparent greenhouse gas benefit of fuel switching
from coal to natural gas. Leaks from gas wells that are no longer
in production raise another source of concern. 106
Measures can be taken to reduce methane leakage, as
demonstrated by newly adopted regulations by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 107 state requirements such as
those in Colorado, 108 good industry practices, and other
programs. 109 In addition, large emitters of greenhouse gases,
including methane, are required to annually publish their

Factual and Ethical Analysis, in SHALE G AS AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY,
supra note 21, at 271.
104. WORKING G ROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE , supra note 43, at 58–59.
105. A. R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas
Systems, 343 SCIENCE 733 (2014); Dana R. Caulton et al., Toward a Better
Understanding and Quantification of Methane Emissions from Shale Gas
Development, 111 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI . 6237 (2014); David T. Allen et al.,
Measurements of Methane Emissions at Natural Gas Production Sites in the
United States, 110 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI . 17768 (2013); Scot M. Miller et al.,
Anthropogenic Emissions of Methane in the United States, 110 PROC. NATL.
ACAD. SCI . 20018 (2013).
In addition, the Environmental Defense Fund commissioned a series of
studies to better understand methane emissions from natural gas production
and distribution. The findings in these studies generally support the
conclusion that methane emissions from gas production and distribution are
significant. For an overview of these studies, see Environmental Defense
Fund, Methane Research: The 16 Study Series (2015), www.edf.org/sites/
default/files/methane_studies_fact_sheet.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, The Worst Gas Leak in California’s History
Isn’t Close to Being Fixed, TIME (Dec. 16, 2015), http://time.com/4149170/
california-natural-gas-methane-leak/.
107. 40 C.F.R. pt. 60.
108. Jennifer Oldham, Colorado First State to Clamp Down on Fracking
Methane Pollution, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 23, 2014), www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-02-24/colorado-first-state-to-clamp-down-on-fracking-methanepollution.html.
109. THE WHITE HOUSE , CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN—STRATEGY TO
REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS (2014), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_2014-03-28_final.pdf.
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emissions. 110 Public reporting may help reduce emissions from gas
production and distribution. Thus, while natural gas systems were
the second largest source of anthropogenic methane emissions in
2013, reported methane emissions from these systems have
declined somewhat since 2007. 111 Still, methane leakage offsets the
ostensible greenhouse gas benefit of natural gas to some degree.
The second problem with the greenhouse gas benefit of shale
gas is that gas is still a fossil fuel. Even if there were no methane
leakage, and natural gas produced half of the emissions of coal, the
use of gas to replace coal does not, by itself, achieve the level of
emissions reduction that is required to meet the greenhouse gas
emissions budget. 112 Government greenhouse gas reduction
strategies are mistakenly placing undue reliance on gas as a
means of reducing emissions, particularly because the annual
reductions achieved thus far do not begin to meet the annual
reductions required to meet the greenhouse gas reduction
budget. 113 The more time passes before carbon dioxide emissions
peak and then decline, the steeper the annual reductions must
be—from 4-5 percent (peaking date of 2015) to 8 percent (peaking
date of 2025). 114 Excluding situations where economic collapse has
occurred, there is only one example of a country that achieved
annual greenhouse gas reductions of more than four percent. 115 By
contrast, the annual changes in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in
2009-2013 were a mix of increases and decreases. 116 Annual
declines from the previous year were in 2009 (-6.5%), 2011 (-1.8%),
and 2012 (-3.4%); annual increases were in 2010 (2.6%) and 2013
(2.0%). 117 That indicates a need for the United States and other
countries to graduate away from all fossil fuels as quickly as
possible. 118 The longer it takes for that to happen, the more severe
the annual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will need to be,
making it unlikely that humans will avoid catastrophic climate
change.

110. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 FED. REG. 58, 260
(Oct. 30, 2009) (codified at 40 CFR pts. 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042,
1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, & 1065).
111. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S.
G REENHOUSE G AS EMISSIONS AND SINKS : 1990–2013, supra note 100, at ES14. Enteric fermentation from domestic livestock —caused by belching or
flatulence—was the largest source of methane emissions. Id. at ES-13.
112. Brown, supra note 103, at 278–83.
113. Id.
114. FAY ET AL., supra note 81, at 40.
115. Id. (citing France when it was developing nuclear power).
116. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S.
G REENHOUSE G AS EMISSIONS AND SINKS : 1990–2013, supra note 100, at ES-5.
117. Id.
118. BROWN, supra note 103, at 282–83.

2015]

Asking the Right Questions About the Future of Shale G as

399

It can be argued that gas is playing a positive role by
destabilizing and weakening coal, which contributes more
greenhouse gas emissions than any other fossil fuel. There is
considerable truth in that argument because gas has displaced
coal to some degree. Still, the annual increases and decreases in
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions are nowhere near the 4-5 percent
annual reductions that are needed, assuming that U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions have peaked. Moreover, net zero greenhouse gas
emissions and significant use of gas cannot be reconciled unless
there is considerable success in carbon removal from the
atmosphere or long-term carbon storage. At present, all
approaches to carbon removal or negative carbon emissions have
significant limitations. 119 Thus, while gas is playing a role in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the continued production and
use of gas is constrained by the greenhouse gas budget—if that
budget is honored.
The INDC submitted by the United States in 2015 prior to the
Paris conference commits the U.S. “to achieve an economy-wide
target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26%-28% below
its 2005 level in 2025.”120 This commitment is based principally on
strengthened fuel economy standards for motor vehicles and
trucks, strengthened and broadened energy efficiency standards
for appliances and equipment, and greenhouse gas limitations for
electric generating facilities. 121
The federal government has adopted increasingly stringent
fuel economy and greenhouse gas emission limitations for motor
vehicles and trucks. In 2010, EPA and the Department of
Transportation adopted a final regulation increasing CAFE
standards for light-duty motor vehicles to a combined average
emissions level of 250 grams of carbon dioxide per mile by 2016, or
35.5 miles per gallon if manufacturers meet them entirely with
fuel efficiency improvements. 122 Then, in 2012, EPA and DOT
issued further rules for passenger cars, light-duty trucks and

119. Pete Smith et al., Biophysical and Economic Limits to Negative CO2
Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 42, 49 (Jan. 2016) (There is no
negative emission technology or combination of technologies that could be
implemented to achieve the 2 degree C goal “without significant impact on
either land, energy, water, nutrient, albedo, or cost” and so the primary
approach must be to “immediately and aggressively reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.”).
120. United States, Cover Note, INDC [Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution], and Accompanying Information (2015), www4.unfccc.int/submis
sions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.
S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20an d%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
121. Id. at 4–5.
122. 75 Fed. Reg. 25, 324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 &
600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533 & 536).
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medium-duty passenger vehicles for model years 2017-2025. 123 The
final standards are projected to result in an average industry fleet
wide level of 163 grams/mile of carbon dioxide in model year 2025,
which is equivalent to 54.5 miles per gallon if achieved exclusively
through fuel economy improvements. 124 EPA and DOT have also
adopted first-ever regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and improve fuel efficiency of medium- and heavy-duty trucks. 125
The Department of Energy has adopted and strengthened
energy efficiency standards for a wide variety of products,
including new refrigerators, air conditioners, clothes washers, and
furnaces. 126 The Department of Energy has also adopted efficiency
standards for electric motors and a variety of other equipment. 127
Taken together, these standards cover “more than 60 products,
representing about 90% of home energy use, 60% of commercial
building energy use, and approximately 30% of industrial energy
use.”128 The Energy Star appliance labeling program, which is
based on voluntary targets that are 10-25% more efficient than
applicable
standards, 129 provides additional reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions. 130 Finally, EPA’s Clean Power Plan,
finalized in August 2015, would reduce greenhouse gases from
electric generating facilities by 32% from 2005 levels by 2030. 131
These and other efforts help put the U.S. on a path to deep
decarbonization. 132 It “is technically feasible for the U.S. to reduce

123. 77 Fed. Reg. 62, 624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 &
600).
124. 77 Fed. Reg. 62, 627.
125. 76 Fed. Reg. 57, 106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86,
600, and others).
126. 10 C.F.R. § 430.32.
127. 10 C.F.R. pt. 431.
128. U.S. Department of Energy, Saving Energy and Money with
Appliance and Equipment Standards in the United States (2015),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/07/f24/Appliance%20and%20Equipment
%20Standards%20Fact%20Sheet%207-21- 15.pdf.
129. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Energy Star Program: Covert
Testing Shows the Energy Star Program Certification Process Is Vulnerable to
Fraud and Abuse 1 (2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/d10470.pdf.
130. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Energy Star® Overview of
2014 Achievements (2015), www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pub
docs/Overview%20of%20Achievements_508Compliant.pdf.
131. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 661
(Oct. 23, 2015), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf. On
February 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of the Clean Power
Plan. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). The Court issued this stay
even though the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
where petitions for review of the rulemaking were pending, had not yet heard
oral argument.
132. United States, Cover Note, INDC, supra note 120, at 1-2.
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[carbon dioxide] emissions from fossil fuel combustion” by 85
percent from 1990 levels by 2050, which is “an order of magnitude
decrease in per capita emissions compared to 2010.” 133 If the U.S.
did that, it would reduce its overall greenhouse gas emissions by
80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. 134
Except for the Clean Power Plan, however, there is no federal
legal mechanism to prod further improvement after 2025, much
less achieve these more ambitious goals. By contrast, the
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES, or the WaxmanMarkey bill, after its sponsors, Reps. Henry Waxman and Edward
Markey), which passed the House of Representatives in 2009,
would have established a cap-and-trade system to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from covered sources 17% below 2005
levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. 135 Because
greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 were 16.6 % greater than those
in 1990, the goal of an 83% percent reduction by 2050 is less
ambitious than an 80 percent reduction by 1990. 136 Still, ACES
would have created a domestic legal framework for reducing
emissions that continued to 2050.
The Paris Agreement may nonetheless prompt a series of
continuing reductions and commensurate laws in the United
States and other countries. These processes are different from the
kinds of obligations that are familiar in environmental law–
obligations, for example, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a
certain amount by a certain date. Rather, these processes may be
understood in terms of reflexive law and governance. Reflexive
approaches are not substantive rules: they improve the capacity of
governmental institutions and other entities to learn about

133. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK & INSTITUTE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , supra note 86,
at 204.
134. JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS , INC. (E3), LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY (LBNL)
& PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY (PNNL), PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES xiii (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep- Decarbonization-Report.pdf.
135. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
§ 304(a) & (b) (2009). The bill was passed by the House of Representatives on
June 26, 2009, but was not passed by the Senate. G OVTRACK.US , H.R. 2454
(111th):
American
Clean
Energy
and
Security
Act
of
2009,
www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/h477.
136. U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 were 7,350.2 million metric
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, compared to 6,301.1 in 1990. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. G REENHOUSE G AS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS : 1990–2013, supra note 100, at ES17-ES19. The 2005
baseline, in other words, is 16.6 percent higher than the 1990 baseline. Thus,
emissions reductions from the 2005 baseline are not as great as those from the
1990 baseline.
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themselves and their actions. 137 They can provide information to
government agencies and institutions on the effectiveness and
impacts of particular laws and policies, which can then be used to
modify those laws and policies. 138 They can also prod governments
and others to improve their practices without being overly
prescriptive. 139
The Paris Agreement is based on reflexive governance at the
national and international level. As already noted, every five years
beginning in 2015, every country is to submit nationally
determined contributions that “represent a progression beyond the
Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and
reflect its highest possible ambition.”140 Every five years beginning
in 2023, the Conference of the Parties is to “take stock of the
implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress
towards achieving” its purpose.”141 These requirements should
encourage or prod governments, including the United States, to be
more ambitious over time, without being prescriptive about what
they should do. These requirements also will provide information
about what other governments are actually doing, as well
information about the effectiveness and impacts of particular laws
and policies. This information can then be used to modify laws and
policies. In addition, because this information will be public,
governments are more likely to honestly and openly share what
they are doing, and be more responsive to the views of
nongovernmental organizations and businesses as well as the
public in general. These outcomes are more likely because every
country agreed to the ambitious goals toward which they are
aimed.
The Paris Agreement thus means that national greenhouse
gas emission laws and policies, including those in the United
States, are likely to become more ambitious over time. The
displacement of coal by natural gas appears to have some value for
at least a limited period, and is likely inevitable in any case for
both economic and regulatory reasons. But to achieve net zero
greenhouse gas emissions, gas will need to be substantially
displaced by energy efficiency and conservation as well as
renewable energy—unless, as stated above, there is a dramatic
breakthrough in carbon storage or removal. The required scale and

137. Sanford E. Gaines, Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable
Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 22 (2002–2003).
138. René Kemp et al., Governance for Sustainable Development: Moving
from Theory to Practice, 8 INT. J. SUSTAINABLE DEV . 12, 23–26 (2005).
139. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV . 1227,
1311–13 (1995).
140. Paris Agreement, supra note 25, art. 4.3.
141. Id. at arts. 14.1, 14.2.
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scope of required emissions reductions, in turn, should influence
investment in shale gas development and production. As Celeste
Hammond has explained, “climate change is an area where asking
the ‘right’ questions can add value, including the value of not
doing the transaction at all.”142 The zero net emissions objective,
for example, could have a substantial effect on return on shale gas
investment as well as on a shale gas lender’s ability to recoup an
investment over the length of a loan.
To be consistent with the scale and pace of required
greenhouse gas reductions, then, the production and use of shale
gas must be nested in ambitious national and international energy
and climate change laws. These laws would assure that shale gas
is a bridge fuel to a sustainable future, and does not delay or
divert from that objective. While the Paris Agreement provides a
structure for the adoption and implementation of appropriate laws
in the U.S. and other countries, some but not all of the legal
structure to do that job is in place.

IV. QUESTION 2: HOW MUCH ENERGY
DO WE NEED?
The dominant perspective on energy is on the supply side: “we
always think we need to find and then use more energy, but we
almost always assume that the efficiency resources are used up
and unavailable.”143 Shale gas, in this context, is simply another
source of the energy we need. A better question is about how much
energy we need. More specifically, how much additional efficiency
can we extract from the economy compared to the amount of shale
gas that can be produced? In the “larger sustainability context,
energy efficiency is likely to be seen as a much better strategy for
the ongoing development of the U.S. economy than shale gas
production.”144 Sustainable development and the Paris Agreement
underscore both the urgency and attractiveness of accelerating
progress in energy efficiency and conservation.
No energy policy choices available to the United States are as
attractive and necessary as energy efficiency and conservation.
Energy efficiency involves doing the same amount of work, or
producing the same amount of goods or services, with less

142. Celeste Hammond, The Evolving Role for Transactional Attorneys
Responding to Client Needs in Adapting to Climate Change, 47 J. MARSHALL
L. REV . 543, 546 (2013–2014).
143. John A. “Skip” Laitner, The Sustainability Imperative of the
Surprisingly Big Energy Efficiency Resource, in SHALE G AS AND THE FUTURE
OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 253, 257.
144. Id. at 256.
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energy. 145 Energy conservation is a broader term; it involves using
less energy, regardless of the whether energy efficiency has
changed. 146
Energy
efficiency
and
conservation
provide
environmental benefits, to be sure; the gallon of gas or the
kilowatt of electricity that is not used is the cleanest of all. That
unused gallon or kilowatt, moreover, is also the cheapest of all.
Even though energy efficiency often involves additional up-front
investment, savings from efficiency provide a return on that
investment and often exceed it.
Energy efficiency and conservation also are the most effective
and sustainable approaches to addressing climate change. Energy
related greenhouse gas emissions are responsible for the great
majority of global greenhouse gas emissions. 147 In addition, 78
percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions increase
between 1970 and 2010 was due to carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes. 148 Energy
efficiency and conservation provide more economic, social,
environmental, and security benefits (e.g., reduced energy costs,
lower pollution, economic development, job creation, less
vulnerability to supply disruption), and fewer costs, than any
means of energy production. 149
To be sure, U.S. energy intensity (energy consumption per
dollar of GDP) continues to improve, signifying some progress in
energy efficiency. Between 1980 and 2014, energy intensity in the
U.S. improved by 50 percent, falling from 12.1 thousand BTUs (or
British Thermal Units) per dollar to 6.1 thousand BTUs. 150 Put
differently, while U.S. gross domestic product increased by 149
percent during that period, U.S. energy use increased by only 26
percent.151 About 60 percent of this improvement was due to
improvements in energy efficiency, while the rest was due to shifts
in the U.S. economy away from energy intensive activities such as
heavy manufacturing. This improvement resulted in savings of

145. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT G ROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY
POLICY 1-3 (2001), www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf.
146. Id.
147. IPCC WORKING G ROUP III, supra note 69, at 354–55.
148. Id. at 6.
149. International Energy Agency, Capturing the Multiple Benefits of
Energy Efficiency (2014), www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MultipleBenefits2014
SUM.pdf; DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCK INSEY G LOBAL INSTITUTE , THE CASE
FOR
INVESTING
IN
ENERGY
PRODUCTIVITY
8,
21-30
(2008),
www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/gpicc/mgi.pdf;
International
Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2006 43 (2006).
150. STEVEN NADEL, NEAL ELLIOTT AND THERESE LANGER, AMERICAN
COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE
UNITED
STATES :
35
YEARS
AND
COUNTING
iv
(2015),
www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/e1502.pdf.
151. Id.
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$800 billion in 2014 to individuals and businesses, or about $2,500
per capita. 152 The average annual decline in energy intensity
during this period was two percent. 153 In no small part because of
legally required improvements in energy efficiency for motor
vehicles, trucks, appliances and industrial equipment, the Energy
Information Administration projected in 2015 that U.S. energy
intensity will decline at a faster pace—an average annual rate of
2.3%—between 2013 and 2040. 154
Still, according to the International Energy Agency, only
about one-third of the energy efficiency potential of the industry,
transportation, power generation, and buildings sectors has been
tapped. 155 Approximately twice as much, or two-thirds, of the longterm economic energy efficiency of these sectors, remains
untapped. 156 Even in the United States, considerable potential
exists for increased improvement in energy efficiency and
conservation. Skip Laitner uses data from several different sources
to compare the potential availability of energy from energy
efficiency, shale gas, and renewable energy (from electricity
sources only), using a common metric of trillion cubic feet (TCF). 157
He concludes that the untapped potential of energy efficiency is
about 1,400 TCF, compared to 900 TCF for shale gas and 600 TCF
equivalent for renewable energy. 158 Other calculations also
conclude that there is significant untapped energy efficiency and
energy conservation potential in the U.S. economy. 159
Several types of legal and policy mechanisms are available for
using energy efficiency and conservation to drive deep reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions. A starting point might be reframing
energy efficiency and conservation—which connote sacrifice to
many—to energy productivity. Energy productivity, which
measures how much energy is needed to produce a dollar of GDP,
may provide a more positive understanding of the importance of
energy efficiency and conservation. 160 Beyond that, existing energy

152. Id.
153. Id. at x.
154. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY
O UTLOOK
2015
WITH
PROJECTIONS
TO
2040
at
17
(2015),
www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf.
155. International Energy Agency, Capturing the Multiple Benefits of
Energy Efficiency, supra note 149, at 19.
156. Id.
157. Laitner, supra note 143, at 262.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., HANNAH CHOI G RANADE ET AL., MCK INSEY & CO.,
UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY iii (2009),
www.greenbuildinglawblog.com/uploads/file/mckinseyUS_energy_efficiency_fu
ll_report.pdf (estimating that an ambitious energy effort could reduce
projected U.S. energy demand by 23% by 2020).
160. Farrell et al., supra note 149, at 7–8. Energy productivity could
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and environmental laws privilege incumbent players (e.g.,
utilities) and existing facilities (coal-fired power plants) in a
variety of ways, and have made it harder for newer entrants (e.g.,
energy efficiency, renewable energy) to compete. 161 Within many
sectors and contexts, moreover, incentives are misaligned, so that
the person with the ability to achieve greater energy efficiency
(e.g., landlord) is frequently not the person who pays the energy
bills (e.g., tenant). Laitner advocates law changes that “even the
playing field,” enabling energy efficiency to “compete effectively
and produce more positive outcomes.” 162 It is often argued that
energy efficiency policy will backfire by, for example, inducing
people to drive their fuel efficient cars more and offsetting the
efficiency gain. There is no empirical evidence for the backfire
hypothesis. 163 Instead, the “total microeconomic rebound is, in
most cases, on the order of 20 to 40 percent.”164

V. QUESTION 3: HOW DO THE BENEFITS OF
SHALE GAS COMPARE WITH ITS COSTS AND THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ALTERNATIVES?
A final unhelpful frame is based on the economic benefits of
shale gas development, including not only economic development
but also jobs and tax revenue. A better question is not about the
economic benefits of shale gas standing alone, but about the
economic benefits of shale gas compared to its costs and risks. A
careful examination of both the benefits and the costs yields a
different assessment than an assessment of the benefits alone.
Moreover, an assessment of the benefits and costs of shale gas,
standing alone, is not as helpful as a comparative assessment of
shale gas and alternatives, including renewable energy and energy
efficiency. Laitner explains that “energy efficiency behaviors and
investments
can
drive
significantly
greater
economic,
environmental, and social beneﬁts than reliance on either

deliver at least half of the emissions reductions needed to keep global
temperatures below two degrees C, and could generate energy savings of as
much as $900 billion annually by 2020. Id. at 8.
161. Laitner, supra note 143, at 268 (“[t]he array of incentives now
provided for conventional energy resources are significantly larger than those
offered for energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies.”) (citations
omitted).
162. Id. at 270.
163. Kenneth Gillingham, David Rapson & Gernot Wagner, The Rebound
Effect and Energy Efficiency Policy, 10 REV . ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y, 68 (2016),
www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/dsrapson/Rebound_Effect_GRW.pdf.
164. Id. This figure, moreover, does not take into account gains in human
wellbeing or induced innovation and productivity growth from an energy
efficiency policy. Id.
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conventional or unconventional energy resources such as shale
gas.”165
Shale gas development presents a variety of costs and risks.
Among the most prominent are water quality degradation and
reduced water availability for consumers.166 Other prominent risks
include not only the climate change effects of methane releases,
which were discussed above, but also seismic effects from drilling
and effects of underground disposal of fracturing fluids. 167
Understanding these risks requires an understanding of what
unconventional gas development entails. Industry representatives
often use the term “fracking” narrowly to refer to the use of highpressure water and explosives to fracture the shale. On the other
hand, the public tends to understand “fracking” to refer to the
entire unconventional gas development process in ways not limited
to hydrofracturing. While industry representatives may be
accurate in claiming a lack of “documented cases” of groundwater
contamination from hydrofracturing, groundwater and well water
contamination from unconventional gas development are well
documented. 168 “Faulty casing and cementing cause most well
integrity problems”169 because they lead to migration into
groundwater of gas, hydrofracturing fluids, or flowback water from
gas production that may include salts and radioactive material.

165. Laitner, supra note 143, at 256.
166. ALAN K RUPNICK, HAL G ORDON & SHEILA O LMSTEAD, PATHWAYS TO
DIALOGUE : WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF
SHALE G AS DEVELOPMENT 18 (2013), www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Work
Images/Download/RFF-Rpt-PathwaystoDialogue_FullRe port.pdf.
167. Maria Gallucci, Oklahoma Earthquakes 2015: Tremors Rise as
Oklahoma Officials Struggle to Stem Fracking Wastewater Flow, INTL. BUS .
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), www.ibtimes.com/oklahoma-earthquakes-2015-tremorsrise-oklahoma-officials-struggle-stem-fracking-2138124;
Ohio
Announces
Tougher Permit Conditions for Drilling Activities Near Faults and Areas of
Seismic Activity, O HIO DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES (Apr. 11, 2014), www2.ohio
dnr.gov/news/post/ohio-announces-tougher-permit-conditions-for-drilling-activi
ties-near-faults-and-areas-of-seismic-activity.
168. See, e.g., Anthony R. Ingraffea et al., Assessment and Risk Analysis of
Casing and Cement Impairment in Oil and Gas Wells in Pennsylvania, 2000–
2012, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI . 10955 (2014); Thomas H. Darrah et al.,
Noble Gases Identify the Mechanisms of Fugitive Gas Contamination in
Drinking Water Wells Overlying the Marcellus and Barnett Shales, 111 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI . 14076 (2014); Laura Legere, DEP Releases Updated Details
on Water Contamination Near Drilling Sites, PITTSBURGH POST-G AZETTE
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-power
source/2014/09/09/DEP-releases-details-on-water-contamination/stories/201409
090010; Avner Vengosh et al., A Critical Review of the Risks to Water
Resources from Unconventional Shale Gas Development and Hydraulic
Fracturing in the United States, 48 ENVTL. SCI . & TECH. 8334 (2014).
169. Robert B. Jackson, The Integrity of Oil and Gas Wells, 111 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI . 10902, 10902 (2014).
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Unconventional gas development also uses considerable
amounts of water. Water availability is particularly a problem in
the upper reaches of streams and waterways, where surface water
withdrawals are more likely to have adverse effects on aquatic
life. 170 In areas that have relatively little rainfall, the use of water
for hydrofracturing can also create or contribute to conflicts over
scarce supplies. 171
Almost nothing is known about potential public health
hazards from shale gas development, including not only toxic
chemicals and pollutants, but also waste, noise, workplace
injuries, and community stress. 172 “Despite broad public concern,
no comprehensive population-based studies of the public health
effects of unconventional natural gas operations exist.” 173
There is considerable variation among states in the regulation
of environmental and public health effects of shale gas. Resources
for the Future issued a report in 2013 that compared 25 separate
aspects of shale gas regulation in 31 states with actual or potential
shale gas production. 174 It found wide variation among states,
including those pertaining to cementing, well diameter, and
thickness of boring pipes; the buffer distance between operational
well pads and neighboring residences, commercial districts,
schools and hospitals, and water supplies; and limitations on
hours of operation, noise, and traffic patterns. 175
A variety of impacts are not addressed by state regulation,
and many require local regulation, particularly of land use.
Development of shale gas can have profound effects on

170. Thomas W. Beauduy, Water Resources Management & Shale Gas
Development in the Susquehanna River Basin: The Lessons Thus Far , paper
presented at Widener University Law School conference, Marcellus Shale
Development and Pennsylvania: What Lessons for Sustainable Energy?,
Harrisburg PA, Sept. 27, 2013, www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&
source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiEy-TDqYzLAhXrsIMKH
cafDTMQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcommonwealthlaw.widener.edu%2
Ffiles%2Fresources%2Fbeauduywaterresourcessusquehanna092713.ppt&usg=
AFQjCNFHnvwzD7xA215oa2fmm Po8luCY TQ.
171. Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas
Production in Texas, U.S., 46 ENVTL. SCI . & TECH. 3580 (2012).
172. Lynn Goldman, Hydrofracking: Potential Health Hazards, paper
presented at Widener University Law School conference, Marcellus Shale
Development and Pennsylvania: What Lessons for Sustainable Ene rgy?,
Harrisburg PA, Sept. 27, 2013.
173. J. L. Adgate, B. D. Goldstein & L. M. McKenzie, Potential Public
Health Hazards, Exposures and Health Effects from Unconventional Natural
Gas Development, 48 ENVTL. SCI . & TECH. 8307 (2014).
174. NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE G AS
REGULATION 1 (2013), www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/
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communities. 176 More than 15.3 million people live “within a mile
of a well that has been drilled since 2000. That is more people than
live in Michigan or New York City.”177 Many of the worst
environmental and public health impacts occur because various
shale gas facilities and activities, including drilling rigs,
compressor stations, and wastewater impoundments, are located
too close to homes, farms, schools, and water resources. Other
impacts include those on housing. Shortages occur during the
boom times, and its negative effects “fall heaviest on those whose
housing situation was most at risk prior to the Marcellus industry
growth, namely the non-working poor, seniors, the disabled and,
newly, the working poor.”178
The question about costs of shale gas and alternatives leads
to answers indicating the value of several different types of laws
and policies. One approach would reduce the adverse impacts of
shale gas development by, for example, strengthening state
regulation to improve the way that information about shale gas
effects is managed and used, 179 improving the public’s ability to
participate in government decision making concerning shale
gas, 180 requiring a public health impact assessment before shale
gas development occurs, 181 requiring companies to account in one
place for all of the costs of using water and chemicals for
hydrofracturing, 182 or creating a presumption in favor of disclosure
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of the names of the chemicals used in hydrofracturing. 183 Greater
public involvement and more comprehensive planning and
decision making for land use and housing are also needed. 184 The
sheer complexity and difficulty of getting the entire regulatory and
legal structure right is considerable, and raises questions about
whether other countries where shale gas is being seriously
considered, such as South Africa and New Zealand, can develop
the capacity to properly regulate shale gas. 185
More broadly, we need a national dialogue on which mix of
different energy resources is likely to ensure the most positive set
of economic, environmental, and social outcomes. 186 That is, we
need to discuss not the merits of shale gas standing alone, but the
merits of shale gas in comparison to other choices. In particular,
“[e]nergy efficiency has the potential to make a much greater
contribution to the economy than shale gas, and can produce
greater benefits.”187 These benefits, which include economic
development, job creation, and lower levels of sulfur dioxide,
particulates, and other health-damaging pollutants, are more
likely to be experienced directly and immediately than reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions. These other benefits, in other words,
are essential to attracting the political support needed to address
climate
change.
This
dialogue—based
on
sustainable
development—can thus play a significant role in accelerating the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement.

VI. CONCLUSION
This article suggests that policy makers and others need to
ask 1) whether the use of shale gas is consistent with the scale and
pace of required greenhouse gas emissions, 2) how much energy we
need, and 3) how the benefits of shale gas compare with the costs
and benefits of alternatives. These three questions put the
challenge and immediacy of addressing climate change squarely in
front of us, rather than treating climate change as a distant issue
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at the margins of our consciousness. The costs of getting climate
change wrong are enormous, and there is abundant economic
analysis that the costs of ignoring climate change are much
greater than the costs of addressing it. 188 Sustainable development
offers a framework for responding to this challenge in a way that
maximizes economic, social, environmental, and even security
benefits. As this article has attempted to show, these questions
mark the divergence of two roads—the business-as-usual road and
the road to a sustainable future. While the latter is now “the one
less traveled by,” taking it “will make all the difference.”

188. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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